A War We Just Might Win

Washington

VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration’s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place.

Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.

After the furnace-like heat, the first thing you notice when you land in Baghdad is the morale of our troops. In previous trips to Iraq we often found American troops angry and frustrated — many sensed they had the wrong strategy, were using the wrong tactics and were risking their lives in pursuit of an approach that could not work.

Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.

Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services — electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation — to the people. Yet in each place, operations had been appropriately tailored to the specific needs of the community. As a result, civilian fatality rates are down roughly a third since the surge began — though they remain very high, underscoring how much more still needs to be done.

In Ramadi, for example, we talked with an outstanding Marine captain whose company was living in harmony in a complex with a (largely Sunni) Iraqi police company and a (largely Shiite) Iraqi Army unit. He and his men had built an Arab-style living room, where he met with the local Sunni sheiks — all formerly allies of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups — who were now competing to secure his friendship.

In Baghdad’s Ghazaliya neighborhood, which has seen some of the worst sectarian combat, we walked a street slowly coming back to life with stores and shoppers. The Sunni residents were unhappy with the nearby police checkpoint, where Shiite officers reportedly abused them, but they seemed genuinely happy with the American soldiers and a mostly Kurdish Iraqi Army company patrolling the street. The local Sunni militia even had agreed to confine itself to its compound once the Americans and Iraqi units arrived.

We traveled to the northern cities of Tal Afar and Mosul. This is an ethnically rich area, with large numbers of Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmens. American troop levels in both cities now number only in the hundreds because the Iraqis have stepped up to the plate. Reliable police officers man the checkpoints in the cities, while Iraqi Army troops cover the countryside. A local mayor told us his greatest fear was an overly rapid American departure from Iraq. All across the country, the dependability of Iraqi security forces over the long term remains a major question mark.

But for now, things look much better than before. American advisers told us that many of the corrupt and sectarian Iraqi commanders who once infested the force have been removed. The American high command assesses that more than three-quarters of the Iraqi Army battalion commanders in Baghdad are now reliable partners (at least for as long as American forces remain in Iraq).

In addition, far more Iraqi units are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion. The Iraqi Army’s highly effective Third Infantry Division started out as overwhelmingly Kurdish in 2005. Today, it is 45 percent Shiite, 28 percent Kurdish, and 27 percent Sunni Arab.

In the past, few Iraqi units could do more than provide a few “jundis” (soldiers) to put a thin Iraqi face on largely American operations. Today, in only a few sectors did we find American commanders complaining that their Iraqi formations were useless — something that was the rule, not the exception, on a previous trip to Iraq in late 2005.

The additional American military formations brought in as part of the surge, General Petraeus’s determination to hold areas until they are truly secure before redeploying units, and the increasing competence of the Iraqis has had another critical effect: no more whack-a-mole, with insurgents popping back up after the Americans leave.

In war, sometimes it’s important to pick the right adversary, and in Iraq we seem to have done so. A major factor in the sudden change in American fortunes has been the outpouring of popular animus against Al Qaeda and other Salafist groups, as well as (to a lesser extent) against Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army.

These groups have tried to impose Shariah law, brutalized average Iraqis to keep them in line, killed important local leaders and seized young women to marry off to their loyalists. The result has been that in the last six months Iraqis have begun to turn on the extremists and turn to the Americans for security and help. The most important and best-known example of this is in Anbar Province, which in less than six months has gone from the worst part of Iraq to the best (outside the Kurdish areas). Today the Sunni sheiks there are close to crippling Al Qaeda and its Salafist allies. Just a few months ago, American marines were fighting for every yard of Ramadi; last week we strolled down its streets without body armor.

Another surprise was how well the coalition’s new Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams are working. Wherever we found a fully staffed team, we also found local Iraqi leaders and businessmen cooperating with it to revive the local economy and build new political structures. Although much more needs to be done to create jobs, a new emphasis on microloans and small-scale projects was having some success where the previous aid programs often built white elephants.

In some places where we have failed to provide the civilian manpower to fill out the reconstruction teams, the surge has still allowed the military to fashion its own advisory groups from battalion, brigade and division staffs. We talked to dozens of military officers who before the war had known little about governance or business but were now ably immersing themselves in projects to provide the average Iraqi with a decent life.

Outside Baghdad, one of the biggest factors in the progress so far has been the efforts to decentralize power to the provinces and local governments. But more must be done. For example, the Iraqi National Police, which are controlled by the Interior Ministry, remain mostly a disaster. In response, many towns and neighborhoods are standing up local police forces, which generally prove more effective, less corrupt and less sectarian. The coalition has to force the warlords in Baghdad to allow the creation of neutral security forces beyond their control.

In the end, the situation in Iraq remains grave. In particular, we still face huge hurdles on the political front. Iraqi politicians of all stripes continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another when major steps towards reconciliation — or at least accommodation — are needed. This cannot continue indefinitely. Otherwise, once we begin to downsize, important communities may not feel committed to the status quo, and Iraqi security forces may splinter along ethnic and religious lines.

How much longer should American troops keep fighting and dying to build a new Iraq while Iraqi leaders fail to do their part? And how much longer can we wear down our forces in this mission? These haunting questions underscore the reality that the surge cannot go on forever. But there is enough good happening on the battlefields of Iraq today that Congress should plan on sustaining the effort at least into 2008.

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I am encouraged that Michael E. O’Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack are identifying themselves with what the perceive as truth. So much of the time those on the opposite side of the administration are like broken records which just keep repeating themselves because of their particular biases.

The comment I wish to make is an indirect one regarding the political situation. Many are stating that even those the surge appears to be working there is no improvement on the political front. I would agree it only the Iraqi Government were to be the determining factor. However, the fact that in many of the towns and villages life is getting safer and the locals are responding in a positive manner will certainly have to have an effect all the way up to the leadership.

It will take time but it seems in the long run any patience exercised now will pay benefits in the long run.

If the United States must remain in Iraq to ensure that the win is a win , is the win a win ? The entire country must be behind all change in the country for a win to be a win and there is no evidence of this coming about in the near future . All of the think tanks are assembled with one major goal in mind , that being , to continue status quo and ensure the elitist population that it will remain in control . Projects are started and carried to fruition by the motives handed out , i.e.  Find the wrong in this situation , Find the right in this situation . When direction is given and adhered to , only the desired output can be realized . When you look only for the bad you tend to overlook the good and conversely , when you look only for the good you tend to over look the bad . What I have just mentioned can be qualified in many of the daily issues / products we live with and around . Knee jerk , firefighting responce is what occurs when we put our faith in most reports coming from people who are for most intents and purposes humans just like the masses and follow directions quite well . Spontaneous , free thinking is the only real investigative device which can be trusted , yet this style might give answers which some might not want to be known .

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Steve Elliot once again tries to spin the truth in something completely different.

True, O'Hanlon and Pollack wrote an op-ed piece on Bush's war on Iraq.  The fact that the New York Times printed the piece is hardly an endorsement of their flawed analysis.  The Times was merely doing what newspapers do - giving space to opposing ideas in the op-ed section.

Coming to a flawed conclusion using equally flawed logic does not the truth make.  The Times is be commended for printing the piece just the same.

Nice try Steve - better luck next time in the headline writing department.

Arby J. Brown said:

Steve Elliot once again tries to spin the truth in something completely different.

True, O'Hanlon and Pollack wrote an op-ed piece on Bush's war on Iraq.  The fact that the New York Times printed the piece is hardly an endorsement of their flawed analysis.  The Times was merely doing what newspapers do - giving space to opposing ideas in the op-ed section.

Coming to a flawed conclusion using equally flawed logic does not the truth make.  The Times is be commended for printing the piece just the same.

Nice try Steve - better luck next time in the headline writing department.

 

Yes, but DER SPIEGEL....THE MOST LIBERAL RAG IN EUROPE has also admittted that the Americans are the ONLY ONES IN THE WORLD who can keep the lid on Baghdad...ANBAR PROVIDENCE IS ABSOLUTE EVIDENCE.

Here is the link to the article written by German Liberal Journalist Ullrich Fichtner:

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,499154,00.html

Put that in your pipe and smoke it! Steve Elliott doesn't SPIN ANYTHING!

 

  

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Der Spiegel , sounds like a nice Irish name for a rag . It has had many articles saying just the opposite and this one prefaces itself by "Today". What is in for tomorrow ? I wish that we not only win , I wish that it had been accomplised three years and many lives ago . I wish every legal citizen could win a lottery so they could hire illegal maids , gardeners , chauffeuers, and assistants to all of these just so Mexico could survive . I also know that wish is a wishy washy word and creates a lot of flipping and flopping which causes a lot of lives to be destroyed along with many billions of dollars . If this was a "Winnable Event" our elite (best in the world) troops would have dones so long before today  . I do know the abilities of our Armed Forces .

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